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Much of the writing we see about politics falls into two categories, each as unsatisfactory 
in its own way as the other. The first and by far the most common of these, which fills up 
acres of space in the newspapers every day, is commentary on the surface flow of events. 
Which politician has said and done what?  What steps have governments announced, 
what policies have they promulgated? What response has been made to these by their 
political opponents?  Who is gaining ground and who is losing it, by such indicators of 
public support as votes, press commentary, opinion polls, or more vaguely, ‘mood’, as in 
‘someone close to the Government said to me in the lobby earlier today’.  
 
Organisations and institutions get a say in this accounting, as when their spokespersons 
announce their dissatisfaction or approval. Even social movements get a look in, if they 
can raise enough noise by demonstration or direct action to raise them above the 
threshold of invisibility.   One can, and does, devour volumes of this kind of stuff on a 
daily basis whilst feeling in the end that one has learned little.  What’s being described 
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here is of course the daily discourse of political practitioners, including the journalists 
whose practice is reporting and commentating.   
 
At the opposite pole, lie more abstract and more scientific forms of discourse, developed 
by political scientists and sociologists.  These trade in models of systemic equilibrium 
and disequilibrium, statistical trends, profiles of public attitudes, models of class 
composition and political affiliation, and the like.  These methods can be illuminating, 
and one can even draw comfort from them.  An example of a recent interesting piece of 
work in this genre is Judis and Texeira’s (2002) book the Emerging Democratic Majority, 
which predicted on the basis of the changing demographics of the United States of 
America, and the rise of a highly educated, post-industrial workforce to a leading position 
in the economy and society, an era of ‘progressive centrism,’ —‘the emerging democratic 
majority’ of the book’s title. Cheered up by this volume, which I had acquired on a visit 
to the West Coast, I enthusiastically passed it over to Stuart Hall on my return home.   
‘It’s somewhat optimistic’, said he sombrely, never one to be deluded by false dawns. 
(Two years later, he was unfortunately proved right when George W, Bush won his 
second term).  
 
Texeira and Judis are politically engaged writers; practitioners of academic forms of 
political science generally hold themselves aloof from political practice, distinguishing 
their ‘value-neutral’ stance from committed political commentary or polemic. A gap is 
thus established between everyday political practice, and the academic study of politics, 
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one which is reinforced by the rewards attached to specialised academic production in 
contrast to writing for general publics.  
 
Stuart Hall’s political writing belongs to neither of these genres, and this has been one of 
the main sources of its originality and brilliance.  What have always interested him are 
neither particular events, nor abstract models alone, but rather the connections between 
them.  The questions for Stuart Hall have always been, one, how can we make sense of 
this or that particular phenomenon, in terms of a broader orienting theoretical 
conception? Secondly, how can we put the theoretical ideas on which all thinking about 
society depends to actual use, in explaining the situations and conjunctions which we 
encounter in an engaged political life?   What has continually amazed me about Stuart 
Hall’s political writing and speaking is the capacity he has to locate meaning in the 
everyday epiphenomena of politics, to see and identify the deep currents beneath the 
flotsam drifting on the surface.  
 
Mapping Social Change 
 
The starting point has always been Stuart Hall’s recognition of how hazy and opaque 
political realities actually are.  We think we know — everyone seems to speak with such 
confidence, all the time — but we do not.  It is as if we are being carried along in a 
political mist, trying to discern new land-forms emerging and disappearing before our 
eyes.  There are maps, which some people have great confidence in, and some of which 
have even been drawn by our own comrades, but unfortunately these are usually at least 
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partly wrong.  In the early days of his political writing, the land-forms which Stuart Hall 
was most interested to understand were those of Britain’s changing class society, which 
he began to map anew in three remarkable papers, ‘A Sense of Classlessness’ (1958), 
‘Absolute Beginnings’ (1959) and ‘The Supply of Demand’ (1960) two of these 
published in Universities and Left Review1 and one in Out of Apathy. What he noticed in 
these articles, and began to give a shape and explanation to, are the changes of social 
identity which were then taking place in Britain’s class society.  The papers describe both 
a new sense of individual freedom and opportunity brought about by relative prosperity 
and the emergence of a consumer-led economy, and the continuing inequalities and 
constraints which prevailed.   
 
‘Absolute Beginnings’ is particularly striking in its interest in both of these dimensions. 
Its first part described the rejections and blockages inherent in the Secondary Modern 
School (this was a review of books by two teachers, Edward Braithwaite and Margareta 
Berger-Hammerschlag, but drew on Stuart Hall’s own experience as a teacher in a south 
London school).  The second part, elaborating a new cultural sociology of the young from 
the point of departure of Colin MacInnes’s novel, Absolute Beginners, described the 
emancipations of identity and style which were then being accomplished by young people 
in the cities, and especially in London. These young people were conspicuous in Soho 
where New Left Review had its office, in the life of the streets, clubs, pubs and coffee 
bars, and in the style-oriented workplaces of the West End. It was a remarkable feature of 
those days that it took an intellectual community consisting of many exiles — from 
Jamaica, Australia, Canada, the USA, and individuals from rather marginal or 
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sequestered native communities — to really appreciate what was going on England at 
that time. The difference between the New Reasoner and the Universities and Left Review 
strands of the early New Left are encapsulated in the fact that the headquarters of the 
former lay in northern industrial Halifax, in Yorkshire, and that the latter had in effect 
just moved down from Oxford to what would soon be called Swinging London.2 
 
In ‘The Supply of Demand’, Stuart identified at a very early stage the great problem 
which the emergence of consumer capitalism was going to pose for socialists. Many 
goods can and will be supplied by the market, and it would be stupid, arrogant, and 
patronising, he noted, not to recognise that many of these bring genuine benefit to large 
numbers of citizens.  It helped in coming to this conclusion that Hall shared and enjoyed 
the ways the people he saw around him dressed, danced, listened to music, and went to 
the cinema - socialist puritanism has never been part of his outlook.  But the other side of 
the argument of the ‘Supply of Demand’ are all those goods that can not be provided 
through shopping, or as items of individual consumption - the health care, education, 
housing, and public space on which society as a bonded and moral entity depends3.  The 
problem is how to refashion the supply of these public goods in ways which can compete 
with the seductions of the market, and of what twenty-five years later we came to call 
‘individualisation’, though much of its essence had already been identified in these early 
essays.  
 
He argued that it was essential to attend to both aspects of the emerging market society 
which involved the satisfaction of people’s needs, and indeed the creation of new 
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demands whose fulfilment gave enjoyment, and to its considerable and inherent lacks. 
Unless one took full note of the creative and inventive capacities of the system one was 
basically opposed to, one had no chance of generating an effective oppositional response 
to it. This has been an almost universal principle in Hall’s political writings.   
 
On the one hand, changes are taking place, which are pushing to the fore individualism, 
competition, and markets of all kinds. These forms of life have popular appeal, and 
would not be succeeding in winning assent and political support if they did not.  There is 
no point in denial, in preferring an ideologically-driven view of reality to the world which 
is taking shape before our eyes.  But on the other hand, we need to resist the remaking of 
the world by capitalism; instead we should be inventing alternatives to class society 
which are egalitarian, democratic, and solidarist, which celebrate difference whilst at the 
same recognising the equal worth and entitlements of all human beings.  It’s a tall order 
to hold together both sides of this argument, and it has always involved Stuart in an 
argument on two fronts.  Socialist orthodoxy has been his antagonist on the first, since he 
has consistently held that conventional socialist beliefs about class structures, identities 
and their contradictions are untenable, and amount to a state of wilful denial of 
unwelcome realities. On the other side his antagonist has been on the right, since his 
commitment has been to promote an alternative socialist future, not to collude with the 
triumph of capitalism. This has usually been an uncomfortable position to occupy, since 
those on the left were often be infuriated by challenges to their traditional view of the 
world, while those on the right recognised an enemy when they saw one.   A duality of 
this kind  has been central to almost all of Hall’s political thought.  
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The Crisis of the Social Order 
 
In the second major phase of Hall’s political writing, he took on a more complex task. 
This was nothing less than to chart the changing shape of class relations in Britain, as 
these were mediated in political and ideological terms over a crucial period of twenty 
years or so.  The intellectual ambitiousness of this project has been to some degree 
obscured by the fact that its principal address, in true Gramscian spirit, has been not to 
the academy, but to participants in the political process itself.  Even though much of the 
work was produced in universities, both in Birmingham at the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, and at the Open University, even the mode of production within the 
university was unusual.  Policing the Crisis, a work of political sociology of the highest 
standard, was published under the co-authorship of Stuart Hall and four other writers who 
were actually graduate students at the Centre during the writing of the book.  Many of the 
remarkable papers which developed the arguments of Policing the Crisis were first 
published in Marxism Today, a monthly magazine which successfully sought a large 
public readership, and which made few concessions to the norms of academic writing.  
 
A more intrinsic feature of this work which somewhat obscures its scope is the way in 
which it moves back and forth between particular instances and theoretical conceptions, 
refraining from developing a theoretical model which can be clearly abstracted from its  
particular there-and-then  uses. It is easy to misremember this project in its narrower 
terms, as an attempt to clarify the phenomenon of Thatcherism, and later, in the debate 
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about ‘New Times’, to find some viable political perspectives for the post-Thatcher 
period. It had this purpose, and was taken up as such by its directly political audience. 
But it was considerably more far-reaching in theoretical terms than this.  In fact one 
cannot understand Hall and his colleagues’ argument about Thatcherism unless one also 
understands the larger theoretical argument about order and conflict in British society in 
which they situated it.    
 
The argument of Policing the Crisis and the subsequent papers is that Thatcherism was 
the solution, for British capital and its associated ruling class interests, to a problem.  One 
had to recognise and understand the problem before one could understand the full scope 
and importance of the New Right’s chosen solution to it.   The analysis, in Policing the 
Crisis, of the long pre-Thatcherite phase of social crisis and deadlock, is as original as 
that of Thatcherism itself. Indeed, without the former Thatcherism is indeed 
unintelligible, and the Thatcher regime becomes instead merely an instance of inspired 
political opportunism by Mrs Thatcher and her associates.    
 
Some on the left criticised Hall’s thesis about Thatcherism on the grounds that it 
misrepresented Thatcher as some kind of new departure, when she was surely a highly 
recognisable and familiar kind of Conservative. ‘Weren’t the Tories always in favour of 
the free market, and of law and order, so why is this anything special?’ they said.  What 
was naive about this reaction was its neglect of the larger framework of the analysis, of a 
social order which had been in a state of deep crisis for two decades. Thatcherism was 
not the first ‘exceptional’ response to have taken place in this situation.  One thing that is 
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remarkable about Policing the Crisis and its accompanying writings is that it charts all of 
this development, and the different tactical adaptations which different political 
formations made to its exigencies. Only on the assumption that nothing ever much 
changes in political life, and that the same battles are continually re-fought on the same 
ground, could one ignore all this, thus sparing oneself the necessity for much thinking.  
 
What is the crisis which Policing the Crisis describes and explains? It was nothing less 
than a general crisis of social order in Britain, part of which was crystallised in the events 
and symbolism of 1968, and of the 1960s more generally. Policing the Crisis was 
successful in bringing together the many different dimensions of this crisis, and to 
connect them within a model of contested hegemony, developed from Gramsci's writings.   
The authors recognised the links between industrial insurgency (in  miners’ strikes which 
had defeated two governments, and in very high rates of strike action generally); a 
generally hyper-inflationary climate, which condensed an excess of demands for public 
and private goods of all kinds; and a sharply-contested moral climate, in  which new 
claims to freedom of speech and behaviour, not least in the sexual domain, provoked an 
extreme conservative reaction, represented by such interventions as the Festival of Light, 
Mrs Mary Whitehouse’s National Viewers and Listeners’ Association, and the Black 
Papers which attacked ‘progressive’ orthodoxies in education. At the same time,  the 
degeneration of the conflict in Northern Ireland into  armed struggle, and broader fears of 
terrorism brought about across the world by groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the 
Weathermen in the USA, the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, and the Angry Brigade 
in Britain, engendered an atmosphere of anxiety and paranoia.   
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Policing the Crisis describes the Selsdon Man phase of the Heath Government of  1970-
74, and the  cumulative repressive moves on which it embarked, before it was pushed by 
the miners into a return to the negotiated corporatism which had emerged in the 1960s as 
the dominant mode of managing class contradictions not only in Britain but across the 
western world.  But then Heath chose to take on the miners in 1974, and lost his ‘who 
governs Britain?’ election, returning Harold Wilson to power for the second time to try 
once more to make this precarious settlement work.  It was only when this collapsed, 
under Callaghan, in the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978-79 that the way finally lay open 
to the more radical social recomposition accomplished by Thatcher.   
 
In other words, Thatcherism emerged as a ‘solution’ to a crisis which had been 
developing for about twenty years.  For much of this time, governments seemed to be at 
the mercy of forces they could not control, and regularly took over each other’s ground 
(for example, in Heath’s corporatist  interventionism, and in Labour’s repressiveness 
towards its own working class constituencies),  under the extreme pressure of events.  
One reason why the Thatcher government maintained its support despite the widespread 
economic damage it inflicted through de-industrialisation, unemployment etc., was 
because  it seemed to have regained  control of an ‘ungovernable’  situation. Indeed the 
Conservatives only lost office much later when they had visibly lost control of events, 
through ‘Black Wednesday’ and the exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the mass 
resistance to the Poll Tax, and in their own internal splits over Europe. 
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The Origins of Thatcherism 
 
If one part of the originality of Hall and colleagues’ work was in describing the ‘problem’ 
of the crisis of order which led to Thatcherism, its other aspect was a brilliant grasp of the 
nature of the ‘solution’, the ‘hegemonic project’ of Thatcherism itself.  Here, once again, 
the procedure was to connect the various particulars which made up the Thatcher 
moment, and see how they had been made to cohere through the exercise of political 
leadership and by their assemblage into a coherent ideological narrative.  Central to all 
this was the issue of ‘law and order’ itself. This was not merely a matter of local 
instances of disorder (urban crimes or riots) but reflected anxieties about a much broader 
social condition.  Policing the Crisis identified the issue of ‘mugging’, exploited by the 
right in the same way as similar racialised anxieties had been exploited by Richard Nixon 
in the USA, as a particular focus of conservative mobilisation, against the ‘threats’ posed 
by immigration and the growing ethnic minority presence in Britain. This issue brought 
race to the centre of Hall’s published work, where it has remained ever since. It 
identified, at an early stage, a fundamental element in the disorganisation of the left in the 
politics of the United States of America and Europe, namely the successful mobilisation 
of working class anxieties to perceived competitors from ethnic minority groups. These 
anxieties had their economic root in the effects of de-industrialisation and globalisation 
on working class living standards and self-respect.  The subsequent rise of the new right 
across Europe has shown how prescient this analysis was. 
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‘Mugging’ was important in the argument of Policing the Crisis, and in the analysis of 
Thatcherism as a major ideological and political formation.  It had been an issue which 
the media, and Conservative politicians were able to seize on, as a signifier for much 
broader social anxieties and antagonisms.  The idea of ‘mugging’ served to condense 
many different fears into one concrete object, indeed as we might now say it became a 
focus of unconscious fantasy.  The various fears were of crime, of young adults perceived 
to be more sexual and dangerous than they were remembered to have been in the 
regulated past, and of course of black people, and immigrants more generally.  Policing 
the Crisis was at pains to demonstrate how the opportunistic focus on this topic had been 
made possible by the elaboration of anxieties about immigration and race over a longer 
period, notably by Enoch Powell.  Hall’s contention was that although Powell might have 
been dismissed from the Heath government for exceeding the limits of acceptable 
rhetoric, he had in fact succeeded in his bid to change the entire political agenda.  The 
potency of this signifier lay in the fact that the implicit reference of ‘mugging’ was 
unmistakably racial, while because this reference was implicit its racial connotations 
could be disavowed. If a certain kind of crime were on the increase, how could anyone 
reasonably object to its being reported, even if its perpetrators happened to be 
disproportionately black?   It was not easy to argue that the reason why mugging had 
been selected for this exceptional level of media attention was because of its racial 
associations.  
 
This argument in Policing the Crisis brought together in the brilliant synthetic mode 
which characterised so much of the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
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Studies and Hall in particular, several explanatory discourses. The ‘new criminologists’ 
in the National Deviancy Symposium, had noted that crime and deviance were not merely 
objective facts, but were culturally constructed entities (Two of Hall’s co-authors in 
Policing the Crisis, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts, were criminologists).  The 
symbolic representation of crime and transgression by the media and by others with 
powers of public definition were important phenomena in themselves, perhaps as 
important as criminal behaviour itself.   The idea of ‘moral panics and folk devils’ had 
already been placed by Stan Cohen (1972/2002) on the agenda of social science, and 
indeed of public debate more generally. Mugging had many of the attributes of the moral 
panic, and muggers were ‘folk devils’ par excellence.  
 
But a more complex theoretical discourse was needed to demonstrate how an apparently 
rather minor issue like this could have a significant role in the transformation of political 
discourse, and in the conquest of a key field of ideological conflict.   Fundamental to this 
was the idea that ideological formations were ‘constructed’ by discursive and political 
action, and were not, as Marxists had tended to believe, merely reflections of social 
realities. Politics was a practice with its own effects. This practice proceeded through the 
construction of discourses which gave a shape and meaning to the experience of subjects, 
and became the symbolic basis of collective identifications. It was vital to understand this 
as the New Right began its ideological advance.  This thinking drew on Gramscian 
conceptions of the cultural dimensions of class struggles, and of the ways in which they 
could solidify in long-lasting regimes of class power, the famed idea of ‘hegemony.  
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Laclau’s charting of the autonomous role of ideological practice in the construction of 
Latin American populism was another important element of this analysis (Laclau 1977).  
 
Althusser’s idea that the antagonistic relations of classes had an inescapably contingent or 
‘conjunctural’ dimension provided a further resource for trying to map this ongoing crisis 
and the fateful outcome to it that was foreseen by Hall and his colleagues.  While 
underlying configurations of power were relatively stable over long periods, in periods of 
instability and crisis the outcomes of struggles could not be predicted from economic 
determinism, or evolutionist presuppositions.  Among the most important elements of 
uncertainty was political action itself, and the processes of persuasive definition and 
interpretation on which this always depended.  Political identifications were always to a 
degree created and chosen, not given. The ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences of which 
the Birmingham Centre was one of the most important  embodiments in Britain in the 
1970s enabled interpretation and definition – the work of the symbolic sphere – to be 
recognised to be a crucial  element in the political process with a causal weight of its 
own.  
 
The argument was not that the manufactured issue of ‘mugging’ had made Thatcherism 
possible, or even been a necessary condition of its success. It is rather that all political 
struggle proceeds through a process of antagonistic and competitive signification. The 
construction of an advancing bloc entails as one of its dimensions the attachment to one 
another of chains of signifiers through which different collective subjects are able to 
recognise themselves and make common cause with one another. Bringing off these 
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semantic linkages and equivalences is one of the principal tasks of political leaders when 
they put together a following. It is through this process of signification, in part, that a 
social bloc is constructed.   
 
 Policing the Crisis and the essays which followed provided an anatomy of a shifting 
discursive field, in which many crucial and disputed terms figured.  In a liberal 
democratic system in which power is won by parties through elections, it is inevitable 
that struggle by signification will happen serially and by accumulation. The news media 
and the consumer public’s insatiable appetite for novelty further determines that 
representations continually change their form, even though one can discern persisting 
objects of reference beneath the shifting patterns.  To be sure, the cyclical electoral 
system does generate its own natural climaxes, and these lead parties to attempt 
condensations of very complex representations into summary versions of themselves, and 
their opponents.  The analysis of Thatcherism described the process of construction, 
maintenance and evolution of a whole programme of representation of this kind, 
including its adaptations to opportunities – such as that provided by the Falklands War in 
1981 – when these arose. 
 
It is consistent with this account of Thatcherism that so important a part was played in the 
development of its signifying structure by specialists in mass communication and mass 
persuasion from the advertising industry, such as the Saatchi Brothers and Sir Tim Rice.  
One can describe the construction of discourses and chains of signification in the 
language of cultural studies or sociology, but its actual practice in developed societies 
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takes place through a highly specialised technical expertise.  One might say that this 
apparently rather theoretical analysis of the discursive construction of Thatcherism 
influenced New Labour to give such great emphasis to the media, in the later construction 
of its own counter-project.   
 
Much work was put into giving coherence to the method of analysis which led to the 
understanding of Thatcherism as a response to the organic crisis of British capital and 
social relations in the 1970s, and some elements of this theoretical synthesis are referred 
to above.  Hall’s approach – enumerated in countless apparently improvised speeches as 
well as in many articles over these years, had another, more intuitive component.  This 
was evident in Hall’s feeling for the significant detail, the turn of phrase, and the event 
given special attention, as starting points for his many explanatory forays.   
 
From Symptoms to Crises  
 
Hall began university as a student of English Literature, and on the completion of his 
undergraduate studies he began to undertake a doctoral thesis on Henry James.  James 
was of course an exemplary practitioner and fastidious advocate of the literary method of 
beginning from particulars. Only from such particulars as can be registered in their full 
immediacy did he believe one could proceed as a writer to larger narratives or 
descriptions of fictional worlds.  James approvingly quotes Ibsen, in this respect a 
kindred spirit,  saying  that he can begin a character from imagining the button on a 
man’s coat, and he refers to the acorn principle, whereby very large literary undertakings  
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start from tiny seeds.  James’s details of course give rise to novels with the most complex 
and fully-realised connectedness imaginable. Some of the satisfaction in reading them 
comes from the density and intricacy of meaning that is revealed as one proceeds,  in 
particular as the world of the novel is made largely through the perception and 
understanding, or its absence, of each of its characters. James’s worlds are intricately  full 
of particulars,  the author himself and his opinions, whatever they may be, deliberately 
remaining in the shadows, behind his characters.   
 
One of the implicit aims of Hall’s accounts of moments or periods in the life of a society 
seems to me to be that in principle they should be inexhaustibly full in their points of 
reference to the particulars of social experience.  It seems that it  ought to be possible,  in 
this approach to political analysis, to start almost anywhere, since any  thread  one 
chooses to start from, once one pulls on it, will lead eventually to the centre or the 
totality. (Except of course that there is no stable centre or totality in this view, but always 
an evolving process)  One of the reason why Hall has been such a gripping speaker and 
writer over the years is that his habit of starting where he happens to be, with the 
observed detail of the moment,  creates a  recognition in his audience of a common 
starting-point  in experience, and they are then invited to participate in an exploration of 
its meaning.  I’ve also seen people asking themselves ’where on earth are we going’ as 
some of his eloquent narratives unfolded, finding the  apparent lack of a obvious map or 
grid references rather disconcerting. But generally the outcome is that one follows a 
process of disclosure of connectedness and meaning from initially apparently inchoate or 
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banal materials.  ‘A figure in the carpet’ emerges, which brings a sense of discovery since 
it was not evident at the start of the journey. 
 
The idea that sociological analysis can proceed from details to structures, from surface to 
depth, has affinities with psychoanalytic methods of investigation, when it is the 
‘material’. Dreams are a good example, which emerges in analytic sessions which leads 
the analyst to explore with the patient the underlying unconscious configuration which is 
shaping his or her state of mind. Lacanian psychoanalytic ideas had some influence on 
Althusser’s theory of conjunctures, helping to explain how an ‘excess’ of meaning and 
force could become concentrated in apparently contingent events.  This Althusserian 
model of ‘ensembles’ of social relations and the ‘conjunctures’ which punctuate their 
development has a contemporary formulation in  ‘complexity theory’ and ‘chaos theory’, 
with their  ‘’butterfly effects’ – the idea that a system can be tipped from one ‘phase-
state’ to another in certain conditions by apparently minor or trivial events.  The crisis 
which is examined in Policing the Crisis is of this kind. The  issue of ‘mugging’  
condensed energies which helped its political definers and operators  - the Thatcherites -  
to move the system from one state to another, bringing about the tipping-over from  its 
decaying ‘corporatist’ mode to its new form of ‘authoritarian populism’.  In this sense the 
particulars on which Hall’s analysis can be read as ‘symptoms’, as nodes of signification 
(and thus of solidarity and power) which can have transformative power.  This may be 
analogous to patterns of psychic crisis in individuals and organisations (we have all 
known these) when some specific event or object becomes the projective focus of intense 
anxiety. The symptom, for Freud, was the psychic system’s means of containing 
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unbearable tensions. The alternative to the hysterical, phobic or obsessive symptom 
might breakdown as the psychic system becomes overwhelmed with desire or anxiety.  
We may see the condensation of social conflicts in heavily charged signifiers of this kind 
– he unburied dead of the ‘Winter of Discontent, the ‘sleaze’ of the late Major 
government, ‘mugging’ in the 1970s,  the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’  of the last 
year or so – as symptoms of this kind. In each case they focused collective sentiments 
which led to or threatened a social convulsion or transformation. The psychoanalyst W R 
Bion called such moments in psychic life experiences which threatened ‘catastrophic 
change,’ not a bad psycho-social description of the onset of Thatcherism.  
 
We are here in fields in which structures have their effects, and become evident, only 
through particular elements of experience, including subjective states of mind. It is the 
latter which gives society and social processes their ability, their capacity to defy and 
transform law-like patterns.  It is this principle of uncertainty and the unknown, to a 
point, which Hall has insisted we must attend to, if we are to learn anything about the 
actual world.    
 
It is interesting to reflect on Hall’s political writing over the years. With this reflection, is 
there anything we should now be doing with this exemplary method to understand our 
current political realities. 
 
 
Where is the Social Crisis Today? 
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Hall himself has written some important essays on the successor epoch to Thatcherism 
and its weakened succession under John Major, namely that of New Labour.  His recent 
paper, “New Labour’s Double Shuffle”, looks characteristically beneath the surface of an 
excessively-discussed topic, that of media ‘spins’, and tries to make some structural sense 
of it.  ‘Spin’, he demonstrates, has been a functional necessity for New Labour since the 
role it has chosen to occupy is to continue the Thatcherite programme of modernisation 
and full ‘marketisation’ of British capitalism, while having to maintain support for this 
project from its working class constituency to whose interests and values are contrary to 
such a programme. ‘Spin’ signifies the continuing necessity to find and impose 
descriptions which will achieve this impossible act of translation.  
 
In previous Labour governments, the compromises with capital unavoidable to social 
democracy were to some degree openly negotiated and contested, within the Labour 
Party and the trade unions, and with a wider public opinion.  In the new situation, the 
institutions where these arguments would previously have taken place have been pushed 
aside, and the very idea that ideological differences are there to be clarified and debated 
is rejected. New Labour is, in its own self-conception, unitary. It is the project of a 
vanguard, now incorporated in or close to government, which formulates its mission as 
‘modernisation’.  But since intractable political realities remain, conflicts and 
contradictions still have to be managed, and in a different way than through the 
conventions of debate which accompanied the earlier settlement, which was essentially, 
as Ralf  Dahrendorf (1959) put it, an institutionalised class compromise. Hall suggested 
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that ‘spin’ was the new institutional device for mediating New Labour’s project of 
modernisation, in many respects a continuation of the Thatcherite programme, to 
constituencies which retained other beliefs and interests.  The controversies over the Iraq 
War have subjected this device to exceptional strain.  The contradictions of the situation 
were most intensely felt within the BBC, whose conception of itself as an institution 
through which differences and oppositions should be negotiated by accepted rules and 
rituals came into collision with the government’s own media apparatus. The two chief 
officers of the BBC were forced to resign as a result, though wider public reactions, and 
the government’s continuing difficulties to win its argument over the war, has held off for 
the moment more lasting damage to the BBC’s mission, as a key institution of  
mediation. Of course all this recalls Hall’s earlier work, also undertaken in a period of 
intense conflict, on the conventions governing news broadcasting, as an instrument of 
managed consensus and compromise (Hall 1980).  
 
But valuable as this ‘Double Shuffle’ intervention has been, there remains a notable 
difference between what we have available to us in the analysis of the present Post-
Thatcher conjuncture, compared with the complexity of analysis that was developed 
previously. The earlier analysis was based on a theory of a larger social crisis, to which 
Thatcherism was able to represent itself as a solution. There could have been no analysis 
of Thatcherism without the prior analysis of the organic crisis of disintegrating 
corporatism, of the eventual failed class deadlock of the post-war era.   Thus, in order to 
understand where we are now, we need to understand why, in the final event, the 
Thatcherite regime disintegrated and was driven ignominiously from power.  That 
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moment was also the expression of a social crisis, objectively speaking. How could it 
have been, we should  have asked,  that the project of completing the ‘Americanisation’ 
and full-marketisation of British capitalism should have foundered so spectacularly on a 
popular demand for better public services and for some reasonable standards of altruism 
in public life?  Thatcherism’s victory must have been far from complete to have led to 
this outcome.  It seemed we had been too overcome by defeat to have noticed that 
democratic social aspirations remained alive and even well, after all that battering.  
Perhaps there had even been an element of emancipation and invigoration brought about 
by Thatcherite populism and assertiveness, its own unintended contribution to the 
democratic cause.  
 
New Labour believed that its only feasible mission was to continue a version of the 
Thatcherite programme, moderated in some respects, reinvigorated in others. It insisted 
on the most minimalist view of what the electorate would tolerate. It brought a renewed 
disciplinary force to the project of public sector reforms initiated by the more capable 
Conservative modernisers.  As every one knows, New Labour in power maintained 
Conservative-defined limits on public expenditure for a full three years after regaining 
office with one of the largest Parliamentary majorities ever.  Those connected with 
Marxism Today were disillusioned with New Labour in office —the one-off revival issue 
of Marxism Today in 1998 put their critique forcefully — but at that point they also 
found it hard to articulate an alternative political course.  They had been among the 
foremost critics of the Old Left, insisting that progressive politics now had to be 
reinvented for these ‘New Times’.  Marxism Today had in this respect given intellectual 
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substance to New Labour’s project of modernisation. But because the old ‘container’ for 
democratic aspirations was now so weak, and because the right had been in power for so 
long, there was nearly everywhere a tacit pessimism or minimalism everywhere about 
what was then possible.  
 
 
But then, around the time of its second election campaign in 2001, New Labour 
underwent a partial self-radicalisation. It then committed substantial resources to selected 
public services, notably health and education, and reaffirmed that its commitment to full 
employment, ‘social inclusion’, and its own ‘war on poverty’ was genuine.  Why did this 
self-radicalisation even take place, and what does this tell us about the ongoing social 
crisis in modern Britain? Is it possible that the weakness of the political expression of 
‘progressive’ social demands led us to underestimate them, even to fail to notice their 
continuing existence?   Is the New Labour’s adoption of its second-term public services 
agenda its own recognition that it had no choice but to do this, if it wished to survive in 
power?   The constituencies on which New Labour was seeking to impose its agenda of 
capitalist modernisation, via the machineries of spin, had after all in some obscure way 
bitten back, and imposed reciprocal demands of their own.  The actual location of this 
social compromise – where the deals were done – remained a mystery.  It seemed to have 
something to do with what went on in the Granita restaurant in 1997, and in the recurrent 
rumours of rows between the occupants of Numbers 10 and 11 Downing Street.   But 
typically enough, these differences were read merely as conflicts of personality and 




Caesarism and Tony Blair  
 
How should we think about the political role of Tony Blair, and the Third Way formation 
around him, in the light of all this?  In his article, ‘The Little Caesars of Social 
Democracy’, Hall provided a brilliant Gramscian characterisation of the project of the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the early 1980s.  In terms drawn from Gramsci’s 
model of Caesarism as a condensation in the person of an individual leader (sometimes a 
collective leader) of social contradictions which it had not been possible to resolve by 
more constitutional   means. The original exemplar of this model of analysis was Marx’s 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, the classical text to which Hall’s historical 
political analysis has also been closest.  Should we not perhaps see Tony Blair as just 
such a ‘Caesar’, chosen by the Labour Party as a leader who was specifically not 
identified with Labour’s own political culture, in order to win much broader cross-class 
support? Blair and his coterie’s rejection of Labourism have often been represented in 
terms of political pragmatism rather than conviction.  This is also how it has preferred to 
represent itself, as a necessary pragmatic solution to Labour’s electoral problem, given 
the withering away of its traditional support base. The fact that Blair has also always 
claimed to be a conviction politician, with a principled agenda, has been somehow 
ignored, as if the convictions themselves, whatever they were, did not matter. In so far as 
there plainly were such convictions, this at least had the advantage of showing that Blair 
was in his own way honest.  
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But suppose we do take Blair and New Labour’s definite  convictions seriously, and 
recognise that they have a fundamentally new project, that they envisage a different kind 
of social settlement altogether than ‘social democracy’. By social democracy I mean the 
institutionalised, pluralist class truce of the earlier social democratic settlement, with its 
shifting balance of public and private sectors, and its significant ‘neutral’ constitutional 
space of mediation between ‘countervailing powers’   (made up of a civil service, of 
independent professions, of strong trade unions, of the judiciary, of public service 
broadcasting, even of autonomous universities.)   The alternative new project is for a 
system substantially dominated by capital, with a state whose role is to secure its 
conditions for existence, not arbitrate between it and contending even if subordinate 
social interests.  The welfare state becomes conceived not as a bastion of alternative 
communitarian values, but as a means for the reproduction of the capitalist work ethic, 
and as a sphere in which new opportunities can be found for private capital accumulation. 
After all, in a post-industrial economy, if capital accumulation is barred from the spheres 
of health, education, social care and transport, its scope of operation is going to be 
severely constrained. The state has to be restructured in managerial terms, to ensure that  
market mentalities – what the Thatcherites used to call the  ‘Enterprise Culture’– are 
inculcated in every sphere of society, overcoming the earlier dualism of an individualist 
private and a broadly collectivist public sector. The managerial state becomes distinct 
from the arbitrating, conflict-managing state.  Mostly the new model state has been 
successful in imposing its disciplines on other social institutions – its burgeoning systems 
of audit and inspection have been one mechanism for this – but it does from time to time 
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meet resistance, from the judiciary, from the public service broadcasters, even from the 
doctors and the military.  
 
It has been easy to see this as a juggernaut rolling all before it.  But then why did this 
partial self-radicalisation take place, why did the government commit itself to a 
substantial enhancement of collective provision, in the first instance in health and 
education, but perhaps shortly in an expanded programme of early years’ child care also.    
The explanation may be that the  sources of  division which brought the social order to  
the point of collapse in the 1970s and 1980s have not in reality gone away, and remain 
latently if rather inchoately present. The petrol price protest movement of two years ago 
showed how great is the latent potential for social disorder, and how quickly a crisis can 
emerge apparently from nowhere.   New Labour’s insistence on its success in maintaining 
economic growth throughout its period of office has as its unspoken shadow its anxiety 
about what would happen if this were to falter.  The splintering of the electorate in the 
current round of elections (June 2004) shows how volatile the political system has 
become, and how weak the hold of the major parties is on the social constituencies which 
they need to sustain them. 
 
From this perspective, the change of course of New Labour in its second term, and the 
different public spending priorities it has adopted, were a prudent judgement of what had 
to be offered to the majority of the electorate if New Labour were to remain in office.  
The New Labour government remains, that is to say, a coalition, in which the radical pro-
capitalist modernisers, whose leader is Blair, share power with a subordinate but still 
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powerful group, whose leader is Brown,  who retain their social democratic 
commitments, despite their endorsement of the Blairite modernising project.  This 
coalition continually threatens to unravel.  If it moves too far to the New Labour right, it 
risks the desertion of its working class voters, and overt opposition from the trade unions, 
still important sources of party funding and support. If it moves too far to the left, it risks 
antagonising its tacit ‘social partners’ in business, and their press baron advocates, and 
losing votes in ‘Middle Britain’. But there is a deeper, more long-term risk, or potential, 
that in so far as New Labour succeeds in office it ipso facto strengthens the democratic 
aspirations which were so beaten down by the years of Thatcherism.  How is it to prevent 
the re-emergence of structures, institutions and agencies which will engender new social 
demands, and will want to renegotiate the terms of settlement between different ‘social 
partners’ and their value-systems?  In other words, success in demonstrating that Labour 
can win and keep power is likely to wake up its various constituencies to the idea that 
perhaps they can ‘ask for more’.  Adjustment to this changing balance of forces has 
already happened, as Labour’s second-term programme showed.  The ongoing  stresses 
on the partnership between Number 10 and Number 11 Downing Street, between Blair 
and Brown, reflect these contradictions of power-base and political purpose.  Ken 
Livingstone’s unique success for Labour in the recent round of elections is another 
indication of the emergence of more autonomous democratic institutions as a 
consequence of even modest achievements.  
 
If ‘Blairism’ was a ‘Caesarist’ moment, what happens when it passes, as it inevitably 
must?  Will the system again be pitched into crisis, with the reawakening of collective 
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action, and a counter-response from the right?  Some unstable resolution of such a crisis 
from the right is one possible outcome of that situation. Or can some routinisation of this 
charismatic, Caesarist moment be achieved, stabilising a lasting settlement between the 
contending conceptions of social order now contained within the New Labour system, 
and making such a social compromise into the ‘common sense of the age’. Is it possible 
to set limits of possibility for the right as the post-war welfare settlement successfully 
achieved fifty years ago? The argument here is that we would have a better chance to 
influence these outcomes if we were to return to the problematic of social crisis which 
Hall originally set out for us, and attempted to analyse this new conjuncture with the 
subtlety and complexity which he brought to its earlier moments. If we do this, we might 
even manage to catch up with the history of our own time.  
 
A Postcolonial Intellectual  
 
I want to conclude with some reflections on how Stuart Hall’s Jamaican origin has been 
fundamental to his work. He came to England as a Rhodes Scholar when he was 
eighteen, and has lived there ever since.  
 
A number of important analyses of contemporary British intellectual history have drawn 
attention to the vital contribution that has been made to it by émigrés and immigrants of 
various kinds.  The central argument of Perry Anderson’s  essay ‘Components of the 
National Culture’  (Anderson 1968) was that English intellectual life had been wholly 
revitalised by the arrival of successive generations of refugees from Europe, who had 
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helped to overcome the insularity and anti-theoretical cast of English thought.  Anderson 
and Nairn cite the influence of Wittgenstein, Malinowski, Namier, Popper, Berlin, 
Hayek, Namier, Gombrich, and Klein, among others. This was mostly a white influx – 
more progressive figures, such as members of the Frankfurt School like Adorno, 
Horkheimer, and Fromm, who went to America instead. The project of the later New Left 
Review, under Anderson’s editorship, was to bring about a comparable exposure of 
British intellectual life to ‘red’ influences from abroad, in particular through the 
translation and assimilation of writing in the Western Marxist tradition – Lukacs, 
Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas, Benjamin and countless more. These became familiar 
figures in British academic life in the 1970s and 1980s, but were scarcely read in 1960.   
 
Terry Eagleton, in his Exiles and Emigres (1970) developed this argument in the context 
of literature, drawing attention to the role of émigrés from the USA, Poland, Ireland, and 
also, following Raymond Williams,  the English working class  in bringing new energies 
into a rather closed and complacent English literary culture.   It is not difficult to update 
this argument by reference to the influence of later Irish, American, and postcolonial 
writers and interpreters, such as Heaney, Plath and Alvarez.   
 
Stuart Hall’s contribution, both in his individual work, and his contribution to the work of 
others around him, needs to be seen in this context, though the fact that he has found such 
a central place in one ‘quarter’ of English intellectual life. In this sense, he was an 
initiator of  the new left, a founder of the major new discipline of cultural studies, holder 
of a major chair at the Open University, key figure in the critical analysis of the move to 
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the right in British politics since 1978, latterly the most influential theorist of issues of 
ethnic identity in Britain. This may have somewhat obscured this aspect. What is 
significant, however, is how much of this influence and contribution has depended on 
Hall’s origin, on his initial distance from the metropolitan society, and has not been 
merely incidental to it.   
 
In fact, a great deal of the freshness and perceptiveness which the grouping of the new 
left took brought to British society and culture came from the fact that so many of them 
came from outside it.  Charles Taylor (French Canada), Norman Birnbaum, Clancy Sigal, 
Norm Fruchter (USA), Peter Worsley (Australia), John Rex (Rhodesia),  Stuart Hall 
(Jamaica) are examples, well represented in the pages of Universities and Left Review and 
New Left Review.  The other New Reasoner  strand of this tradition, came from a different 
kind of ‘outside’, that of the ‘small world of British Communism’, represented in the 
Oxford-London new left by Raphael Samuel, and by the larger group of New Reasoners.  
It was from these ‘outsider’ locations that it was possible to ‘pick up’ so quickly and 
sensitively what was changing in British social relations,  and what was so limited about 
the standard political repertoires, whether Fabian or Communist.   
 
Sensitivity to issues of empire and race were there from the beginning in this project. 
Suez – a late but it now turns out by no means the last paroxysm of the Empire – was one 
of the founding moments for the formation of the new left.  The idea of ‘positive 
neutralism’ developed in association with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND), drew heavily on the anti-imperialist identifications of ex-colonials such as 
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Worsley, Rex Nettleford, and Stuart Hall, as well as on the commitment to find some 
space independent of both capitalism and state  communism.   This ‘positive neutralism’ 
looked to the non-aligned, post-imperial nations – India, Ghana, Indonesia, Egypt, and 
the Bandung Conference  –  for a new leadership. Gandhi’s idea of non-violent resistance 
was also one of the inspirations of CND.  Recognition of the role that race was going to 
play in the politics of the British right also came very early, in the involvement of the 
New Left, by Stuart Hall in particular, in the community politics of Notting Hill, one of 
the first areas where antagonism towards Caribbean immigrants became mobilised by the 
right.  Recognition of new kinds of freedom and expressiveness among young people in 
the cities, reported in the ‘Absolute Beginnings’ essay mentioned above, included  noting 
that black youngsters, and cultural models for white young people which were being 
taken from black culture, were part of this. Colin MacInnes, who was one of the 
inspirations for Hall’s essay, was another incomer, from Australia.   
 
When youth culture came to be one of the foremost topics of investigation by the young 
researchers at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, the 
interfusion of different ethnic voices and styles, in music in particular, was a central and 
liberating discovery.  It seemed that here for once ethnic differences were a resource 
which young people were celebrating and making creative use of, something which has 
continued to fertilise British popular culture to this day.   
 
The analysis of Thatcherism developed in Policing the Crisis and in the subsequent 
Marxism Today essays began as a response to police and media activities which were 
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focused on race in Birmingham, which is the context for much of the media analysis of 
the book.  The issue of ‘mugging’ led the way to the recognition of the role of racial 
antagonism in the construction of the new left, through Enoch Powell’s success in 
racialising the political agenda (even though he was himself removed from office by 
Edward Heath), and through Thatcher’s confident mobilisation of racial anxieties (the 
danger of the ‘swamping’ – a term chosen with intuitive cleverness – of indigenous 
communities by immigrants). The analysis of Thatcherism in ‘The ‘Great Moving Right 
Show’  and elsewhere note the reassertion of British national and imperial identity, 
against ‘others’ of several kinds, as one of its central ideological components. 
 
Whereas in much of Hall’s earlier work, ethnicity has been a crucial dimension in a more 
inclusive political and cultural analysis, in recent years he has come to address its 
importance more directly.  As questions of ethnic self-definition became important in the 
black community, and as the question of national and ethnic identities became important 
in multiracial and multicultural Britain, Hall made his intervention through his idea of 
ethnic hybridity, his insistence that ethnicities were made through processes of social and 
cultural definition, and did not exist as natural essences. This analysis drew on ideas of 
cultural construction developed within cultural studies, to explore issues of gender and 
sexuality as well as class and race. This argument drew attention both to the emergence 
of new identities – ‘new ethnicities’ – made possible by experiences of migration, of its 
second and third generation communities, and the many interactions with other 
communities that were taking place. It was also a critique of, and a cautionary warning 
against, ethnic essentialism and separatism among black radicals, in which he did not see 
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much promise. His BBC television series on the Caribbean gave a memorable exploration 
to these ideas of ethnic hybridity and difference, exploring as it did the significant ethnic 
and cultural mixes – between African, Indian, British, French, Spanish, and North 
American inputs – that make the Caribbean islands so distinct from one another.   As he 
has himself said, he did not know himself to be a ‘West Indian’ until he arrived in 
England, and found himself part of a small community made up of people – including a 
group of novelists - from Caribbean islands he scarcely knew, and had never visited. 
Another more recent television series made on the 50th anniversary of the docking of the 
‘Empire Windrush’ in 1948, which began the major post-war Caribbean migration into 
Britain, recorded the psychic disappointments and deep injuries inflicted on the new 
arrivals, who imagined Britain from its own idealised imperial representation of itself, 
and encountered something quite different, and mostly far from welcoming. However, 
one could draw more positive implications from the Windrush television series taken as a 
whole, since so much could be seen to have changed for the better since those early days.   
 
Hall became active in the defence of the rights of black people in Britain, for example as 
a member of the Runnymede Commission following the Stephen Lawrence murder. In 
this context he has taken up positions which are militant in demanding just and equal 
treatment for black citizens, even though he has remained committed at the same time to 
the encouragement of cultural diversity. 
 
The courses he helped to develop at the Open University, whose publications have much 
wider dissemination than any other degree programmes in the UK, gave particular 
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emphasis to issues of modernity, globalisation, and identity, to which the history and 
consequences of empire, and the dimensions of ethnicity, are fundamental.   
 
For the last few years, post-retirement and away from a formal institutional role in a 
university, Hall has undertaken more of his work within the context of ethnic minority 
cultural communities, notably in engaging with photography and the visual arts as 
expressions and explorations of ethnic identities in Britain.  This work has given rise to 
significant writings, which are at this point probably rather less well known than his 
earlier work in cultural studies, politics and sociology.   He is a very active chairman of 
the International Institute for the Visual Arts (inIVA) which is in process of funding a 
major new cultural institute in London devoted to ethnic perspectives on the visual arts. If 
this project succeeds, as it will probably do, it will constitute a major addition to 
London’s cultural landscape, giving a new centrality to multi-ethnic culture in London, 
and to the contribution of the various overseas Diasporas to which it is connected.  
 
It should be clear then that Stuart Hall’s postcolonial formation (Jamaica was not yet 
even independent when he left for university in Britain in 1952) has been fundamental to 
nearly all of his work.  He has interpreted British society and culture from the perspective 
of someone who was both deeply formed by it, as a colonial citizen, but was also an 
outsider to it.  His work has from the beginning made the British notice the significance 
of racial differences in their midst, and take some explicit note of their imperial identity 
as something to question and ponder.   For most of Hall’s career, has been to seek always 
to connect one thing to another, to make ethnicity and colonisation visible and evident as 
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part of a larger totality of culture or politics, and not to insist on their separateness. One 
can see in this an implicit 'strategy of alliances’ on the left, which aims to link anti-
colonial and anti-racist politics, fundamental to Hall’s position, to a broader ensemble of 
issues and antagonisms, in relation to domestic political alignments in Britain, to the 
recomposition of cultural studies, sociology, and politics as fields of study, and earlier on 
to the issues of the Cold War.  It seems probable that the strong tradition of anti-
colonialism in British liberalism and on the left, and the relatively peaceful transition to 
independence in some of Britain’s former colonies, made this option more feasible than it 
would otherwise have been.  There was always some receptive ground for anti-racist and 
anti-imperialist politics in Britain, reflected also for example in the vigorous anti-
apartheid campaign. This approach has enabled Hall, as a postcolonial intellectual from 
Jamaica, to be accepted as a formative and deeply-admired figure on the left of British 
politics and cultural life. He has contributed substantially, in this way, to the acceptance 
and valuing of contributions to the national culture by those of diasporic origins, and to 
the cultural diversification of British life.  The establishment of inIVA will among things 
show how many others have been able to follow in these footsteps, even in a society 
which retains many racist and exclusionary habits of mind.  It has been possible for Hall 
to do all this without making compromises or disavowals of his own commitments or 
integrity. One consequence of this is that he has remained a dissenting and non-
incorporated figure in British public life, slightly awkward for even the left-centre 
establishment to deal with. He has thus had less influence with mainstream Labour, and 
with its government, and has had a less visible media presence, than one might have 
hoped. It should be noted as a fact that despite Hall’s considerable success in interpreting 
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the Caribbean Diaspora in Britain to itself, and to the British, not much interest seems to 
have been taken until lately in these explorations in the Caribbean itself. But perhaps this 
is now changing. 
 
There have no doubt been different ways of taking up the role of a postcolonial 
intellectual in the past fifty years. Stuart Hall’s way of doing this has been to make 
himself fully at home in his country of migration,  but  spend a good part of a lifetime 
there trying to change its ways of thinking to take account of experiences of millions of 
people like him.   British academic, cultural and political life is much better for his efforts 
than it would have been without them.  Space has been made for others to continue this 
work.   Hall does not see himself as a political optimist - pessimism of the intellect, 
facing up to the real, have been his watchwords.   But there has been something deeply 
hopeful about his commitment to finding people who will listen and respond if one shares 
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